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Abstract: The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the full set of
many-to-many stable matchings when agents have substitutable prefer-
ences. The algorithm starts by calculating the two optimal stable match-
ings using the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Then, it computes each re-
maining stable matching as the firm-optimal stable matching correspond-
ing to a new preference profile which is obtained after modifying the pref-
erences of a previously identified sequence of firms.
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1 Introduction
The paper proposes an algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable
matchings when agents have substitutable preferences.
Many-to-many matching models have been useful for studying assignment
problems with the distinctive feature that agents can be divided from the very
beginning into two disjoint subsets: the set of firms and the set of workers.1 The
nature of the assignment problem consists of matching each agent (firms and
workers) with a subset of agents from the other side of the market. Thus, each
firm will hire a subset of workers while each worker may work for a number of
diﬀerent firms.
Agents have preferences on the subsets of potential partners. Stability has
been considered the main property to be satisfied by any sensible matching. A
matching is called stable if all agents are matched to an acceptable subset of
partners and there is no unmatched worker-firm pair who both would prefer to
add the other to their current subset of partners. To give blocking power to only
individual agents and worker-firm pairs seems a very weak requirement in terms
of the durability of the matching.2
Unfortunately the set of stable matchings may be empty. Substitutability is
1We will be using as a reference (and as a source of terminology) labor markets with part-
time jobs and we will generically refer to these two sets as the two sides of the market.
2Sotomayor (1999a) uses the name of pairwise stability to refer to this notion of stability. In
her paper, she proposes the stronger concept of setwise stability and shows that in the many-
to-many model the set of pairwise stable matchings, the core, and the set of setwise stable
matchings do not coincide. As far as we know, the construction of algorithms using these last
two group stability concepts are still open problems.
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the weakest condition that has so far been imposed on agents’ preferences under
which the existence of stable matchings is guaranteed. An agent has substitutable
preferences if he continues to want to be partners with an agent from the other
side of the market even if other agents become unavailable.3
Surprisingly, the set of stable matchings under substitutable preferences is
very-well structured. It contains two distinctive matchings: the firm-optimal sta-
ble matching (denoted by µF ) and the worker-optimal stable matching (denoted
by µW ). The matching µF is unanimously considered by all firms to be the best
among all stable matchings and by all workers to be the worst among all sta-
ble matchings. Symmetrically, the matching µW is unanimously considered by
all workers to be the best among all stable matchings and by all firms to be
the worst among all stable matchings. They can be obtained by the so-called
deferred-acceptance algorithm (originally defined by Gale and Shapley (1962)
for the one-to-one case and later adapted by Roth (1984) to the many-to-many
case). Additionally, Blair (1988) shows that the set of stable matchings has a
lattice structure.4 In particular, Roth (1984) and Blair (1988) show that this
unanimity and opposition of interests of the two sides of the market is even
stronger in the sense that all firms, if they had to choose the best subset from the
3See Definition 3 for a formal statement of this property. Kelso and Crawford (1982) were
the first to use it to show the existence of stable matchings in a many-to-one model with money.
Roth (1984) shows that if all agents have substitutable preferences the set of many-to-many
stable matchings is non-empty.
4Roth (1985), Gusfield and Irving (1989), Sotomayor (1999b), Alkan (2001), Baïou and
Balinski (2000), and Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2001) also study the lattice structure
of the set of stable matchings in diﬀerent models.
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set of workers made up of the union of the firm-optimal stable matching and any
other stable matching, would choose the firm-optimal stable matching. Also, all
firms, if they had to choose the best subset from the set of workers made up of
the union of the worker-optimal stable matching and any other stable matching,
would choose the other stable matching. And symmetrically, the two properties
also hold interchanging the roles of firms and workers.5
Algorithms have played a central role in the matching literature.6 While there
are algorithms designed to compute the full set of one-to-one stable matchings as
well as the two optimal stable matchings (for the many-to-many model) we are not
aware of any algorithm which can compute the full set of matchings for this more
general many-to-many case. Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing
for the first time an algorithm that computes the full set of stable matchings in
a general model with ordinal preferences. In contrast with the marriage model,
the structure of this set is not yet fully understood (Alkan (2001), Blair (1988),
Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2001), Roth (1985), Sotomayor (1999a),
and Sotomayor (1999b) are, among others, examples of papers contributing to
this understanding). One of the potential uses of our algorithm is to generate
conjectures, counterexamples, and intuitions to make progress in the study of
this more general matching model.
McVitie and Wilson (1971) were the first to obtain an algorithm to compute
5See Remark 1 in Section 2 for a formal statement of these four properties.
6See Gusfield and Irving (1989) for an algorithmic approach to the one-to-one and roommate
models.
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the full set of stable matchings for the one-to-one matching model. Our algorithm
extends theirs to the many-to-many matching model with substitutable prefer-
ences. Irving and Leather (1986) proposed a diﬀerent algorithm to compute the
set of one-to-one stable matchings based on its lattice structure (see also Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) for an adapted description of this algorithm). In Subsec-
tion 3.3 we briefly describe McVitie and Wilson’s algorithm and explain why our
algorithm reduces to theirs whenever the matching model is one-to-one; we also
briefly explain why this is not the case for the Irving and Leather algorithm.
Roughly, our algorithm works by applying successively the following proce-
dure. First, given as input an original profile of substitutable preferences, it
computes by the deferred-acceptance algorithm the two optimal stable match-
ings µF and µW . Second, it identifies all firm-worker pairs (f, w) where firm f
hires the worker w in µF but not in µW . Successively, for each of these pairs, it
modifies the preference of firm f by declaring all subsets of workers containing
worker w unacceptable but leaving the orderings among all subsets not containing
w unchanged. This is called an (f,w)-truncation of the original preference. By
the deferred-acceptance algorithm it computes (for each pair) the firm-optimal
stable matching corresponding to the preference profile where all agents have the
original preferences except that firm f has the (f, w)-truncated preference. Third,
although this new firm-optimal stable matching might not be stable relative to
the original preference profile it is stable provided that worker w, if he had to
choose the best subset from the set of firms made up of the union of the two
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firm-optimal stable matchings (the original and the new one) he would choose
the new one. If it passes this test (and hence, if it is stable relative to the origi-
nal profile of preferences) we keep it and proceed again from the very beginning
using this modified profile as an input.7 The algorithm stops when there is no
firm-worker pair (f,w) where firm f hires worker w in the firm-optimal stable
matching (relative to the truncated preference profile) but not in µW .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary
notation, definitions, and results. Section 3 contains the definition of the algo-
rithm, the Theorem stating that the outcome of the algorithm is equal to the set
of stable matchings, and an example illustrating how the algorithm works. In
Section 4 we prove the Theorem. Section 5 contains two concluding remarks. Fi-
nally, an Appendix at the end of the paper illustrates by means of an example the
deferred-acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley adapted to the many-to-many
case.
2 Preliminaries
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n firms F = {f1, ..., fn} and
the set of m workers W = {w1, ..., wm}. Generic elements of both sets will be
denoted, respectively, by f , fi, fik , f¯ , and f˜ , and by w, wj, wjk , w¯, and w˜. A
generic agent will be denoted by a, and we will refer to a set of partners of a
7In the formal definition of the algorithm the reader will find an additional (but dispensable)
step only used to speed up the algorithm.
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as a subset of agents of the set not containing a. Associated with each agent
a ∈ F ∪ W is a strict linear ordering P (a), called a preference relation, over
the set of all subsets of partners (over 2F if a is a worker and over 2W if a is a
firm). Preference profiles are (n+m)-tuples of preference relations, and they are
represented by P = (P (f1) , ..., P (fn) ;P (w1) , ..., P (wm)). Given a preference
relation of an agent P (a) the sets of partners preferred to the empty set by a
are called acceptable; therefore, we are allowing for the possibility that firm f
may prefer not hiring any worker rather than hiring unacceptable sets of workers
and that worker w may prefer to remain unemployed rather than working for an
unacceptable set of firms.
To express preference relations in a concise manner, and since only acceptable
sets of partners will matter, we will represent preference relations as lists of
acceptable partners. For instance,
P (fi) = w1w3, w2, w1, w3
P (wj) = f1f3, f1, f3
indicate that {w1, w3}P (fi) {w2}P (fi) {w1}P (fi) {w3}P (fi) ∅ and
{f1, f3}P (wj) {f1}P (wj) {f3}P (wj) ∅.
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms keeping the
bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that both,
firms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally,
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Definition 1 A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of
all subsets of F ∪W such that for all w ∈W and f ∈ F :
1. µ (w) ∈ 2F .
2. µ (f) ∈ 2W .
3. f ∈ µ (w) if and only if w ∈ µ (f) .
We say that an agent a is single if µ (a) = ∅, otherwise he is matched. A
matching µ is said to be one-to-one if firms can hire at most one worker and
workers can work for at most one firm. The model in which all matchings are
one-to-one is also known in the literature as the marriage model. A matching
µ is said to be many-to-one if workers can work for at most one firm but firms
may hire many workers. The model in which all matchings are many-to-one, and
firms have responsive preferences,8 is also known in the literature as the college
admissions model.
Let P be a preference profile. Given a set of partners S, let Ch (S, P (a))
denote agent a’s most-preferred subset of S according to a’s preference ordering
P (a). A matching µ is blocked by agent a if µ (a) 6= Ch (µ (a) , P (a)). We say
that a matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by any agent. We will
denote by IR (P ) the set of all individually rational matchings. A matching µ is
8Namely, for any two subsets of workers that diﬀer in only one worker a firm prefers the
subset containing the most-preferred worker. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a precise and
formal definition of responsive preferences as well as for a masterful and illuminating analysis
of these models and an exhaustive bibliography.
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blocked by a worker-firm pair (w, f) if w /∈ µ (f), w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w} , P (f)),
and f ∈ Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f} , P (w)).
Definition 2 A matching µ is stable if it is blocked neither by an individual
agent nor by a worker-firm pair.
Given a preference profile P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ). It
is easy to construct examples of preference profiles with the property that the
set of stable matchings is empty (see, for instance, Example 2.7 in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)). Those examples share the feature that at least one agent
regards two partners as being complements, in the sense that the desirability of
a partner might depend on the presence of the other one. This is the reason
why the literature has focused on the restriction where partners are regarded as
substitutes. Here the assumption that preference profiles are substitutable will
be essential.
Definition 3 An agent a’s preference ordering P (a) satisfies substitutability
if for any set S of partners containing agents b and c (b 6= c), if b ∈ Ch (S, P (a))
then b ∈ Ch (S\ {c} , P (a)).
A preference profile P is substitutable if for each agent a, the preference order-
ing P (a) satisfies substitutability. Observe that this many-to-many model with
substitutable preferences includes, as particular cases, the marriage model and
the college admissions model.
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Roth (1984) shows that if all agents have substitutable preferences then: (1)
the set of stable matchings is non-empty, (2) firms (workers) unanimously agree
that a stable matching µF (µW ) is the best stable matching, and (3) the optimal
stable matching for one side is the worst stable matching for the other side. The
matchings µF and µW are called, respectively, the firm-optimal stable matching
and the worker-optimal stable matching. We are following the convention of
extending preferences from the original sets (2W and 2F ) to the set of matchings.
However, we now have to consider weak orderings since the matchings µ and
µ0 may associate the same set of partners to an agent. These orderings will be
denoted by R (f) and R (w). For instance, to say that all firms prefer µF to any
stable µ means that for every f ∈ F we have that µFR (f)µ for all stable µ (that
is, either µF (f) = µ (f) or else µF (f)P (f)µ (f)).
The deferred-acceptance algorithm, originally defined by Gale and Shapley
(1962) for the one-to-one case, produces either µF or µW depending on who
makes the oﬀers. At any step of the algorithm in which firms make oﬀers, a firm
proposes itself to the most-preferred subset of the set of workers that have not
already rejected it during the previous steps, while a worker accepts the choice set
of the union of the set consisting of the firms provisionally matched to him in the
previous step (if any) and the set of current proposals. The algorithm stops at
the step at which all oﬀers are accepted; the (provisional) matching then becomes
definite and is the stable matching µF . Symmetrically, if workers make oﬀers,
the outcome of the algorithm is the stable matching µW . The Appendix at the
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end of the paper illustrates by means of an example how the deferred-acceptance
algorithm works for the many-to-many case.
Our algorithmwill consist of applying the deferred-acceptance algorithmwhere
firms make oﬀers to preference profiles that are obtained after modifying the pref-
erence of a firm by making all sets containing a particular worker unacceptable.9
Formally,
Definition 4 We say that the preference P (f,w) (f) is the (f, w)−truncation of
P (f) if:
1. All sets containing w are unacceptable to f according to P (f,w) (f); that is,
if w ∈ S then ∅P (f,w) (f)S.
2. The preferences P (f) and P (f,w) (f) coincide on all sets that do not contain
w; that is, if w /∈ S1 ∪ S2 then S1P (f)S2 if and only if S1P (f,w) (f)S2.
3. The preferences P (f) and P (f,w) (f) coincide on all sets that contain w;
that is, if w ∈ S1 ∩ S2 then S1P (f)S2 if and only if S1P (f,w) (f)S2.
4. All sets “artificially” made unacceptable in P (f,w) (f) are preferred to the
original unacceptable sets; that is, if S1 and S2 are such that w ∈ S1 and
S1P (f) ∅P (f)S2 then S1P (f,w) (f)S2.
Notice that conditions 3 and 4, although irrelevant for stability of match-
ings, guarantee that given P (f) and w, the corresponding truncation P (f,w) (f)
9Given the symmetric role of firms and workers it will become clear that the construction
that follows could be equivalently done by interchanging the roles of workers and firms.
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is unique. Given a preference profile P and the (f,w)−truncation of P (f) we de-
note by P (f,w) the preference profile obtained by replacing P (f) in P by P (f,w) (f);
that is, P (a) = P (f,w) (a) for all agents a 6= f and P (f) and P (f,w) (f) diﬀer,
essentially, in that P (f,w) (f) eliminates, as acceptable, all sets of workers that
contain w. We denote by µ(f,w)F and µ
(f,w)
W the firm and worker-optimal stable
matchings corresponding to the preference profile P (f,w). Moreover, given a pref-
erence profile P and a sequence of pairs (fi1 , wj1) ... (fik , wjk) we will represent by
P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk ) the preference profile obtained from P after successively trun-
cating the corresponding preference(s); we will also denote by µ
(fi1 ,wj1 )...(fik ,wjk )
F
and µ
(fi1 ,wj1 )...(fik ,wjk )
W its corresponding optimal stable matchings. The following
lemma states that the property of substitutability is preserved by truncations,
and therefore µ(f,w)F and µ
(f,w)
W exist provided that P is substitutable.
Lemma 1 If P (f) is substitutable, then P (f,w)(f) is substitutable.
Proof. Let w¯, w0 ∈ S be arbitrary and assume that w¯ ∈ Ch(S, P (f,w)(f)). If
w /∈ S, then w¯ ∈ Ch(S\{w0}, P (f,w)(f)) because Ch(S, P (f,w)(f)) = Ch(S, P (f)),
Ch(S\{w0}, P (f,w)(f)) = Ch(S\{w0}, P (f)), and because of the substitutability
of P (f). Ifw ∈ S, then we have thatCh(S, P (f,w) (f)) = Ch(S\{w}, P (f)); there-
fore, by assumption w¯ ∈ Ch(S\{w}, P (f)). By the substitutability of P (f) we
have that w¯ ∈ Ch([S\{w}]\{w0}, P (f)) but the equalityCh([S\{w}]\{w0}, P (f)) =
Ch(S\{w0}, P (f,w)(f)) implies that worker w¯ ∈ Ch(S\{w0}, P (f,w)(f)).
Before finishing this section we present, as a Remark below, four properties
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of stable matchings.
Remark 1 Assume P is substitutable, and let µ ∈ S (P ) . Then, for all f and
w:
1. Ch (µF (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) = µF (f).
2. Ch (µW (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w)) = µW (w).
3. Ch (µW (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) = µ (f).
4. Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w)) = µ (w).
Properties 1 and 2 are due to Roth (1984) while properties 3 and 4 follow from
1, 2, and Theorem 4.5 in Blair (1988). They can be interpreted as a strengthening
of the optimality of µF and µW . Example 1 below shows that, although necessary,
they are far from being a characterization of stable matchings.
Example 1 Let F = {f1, f2, f3, f4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} be the two sets
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of agents with the preference profile P , where
P (f1) = w1, w2, w3, w4
P (f2) = w2, w4, w1
P (f3) = w3, w1, w2
P (f4) = w4, w2, w3
P (w1) = f2, f3, f1
P (w2) = f3, f1, f4, f2
P (w3) = f4, f1, f3
P (w4) = f1, f2, f4.
The matching
µ =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3 w4 w1 w2


is not stable since (w2, f1) blocks it.10 However, it can be verified that
µF =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1 w2 w3 w4

 ,
µW =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w4 w1 w2 w3

 ,
and µ satisfies the four properties of Remark 1.
10To represent matchings concisely we follow the widespread notation where for instance here,
in matching µ, f1 is matched to w3, f2 is matched to w4, and so on.
14
The fact that whether or not Property 4 in Remark 1 holds only for a partic-
ular worker w will play a crucial role in the construction of our algorithm, we will
sometimes refer to it as the Choice Property for w relative to P . More precisely,
given P and its corresponding µF , we say that a matching µ satisfies the Choice
Property for w relative to P if
Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w)) = µ (w) .
3 An Algorithm to compute the set of stable
matchings
3.1 The Algorithm and the Theorem
Given a preference profile P , we define an algorithm to compute the set of stable
matchings S (P ).
begin Set T 0(P ) := P , S0(P ) := {µF}, and k := 0.
repeat
Step 1: Define
eT ¡T k (P )¢ =



P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w) | w ∈ µ(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)F (f) \µW (f) ,
P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk) ∈ T k (P ) , and f ∈ F



.
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Step 2: if eT ¡T k (P )¢ = ∅ set T k+1 (P ) = ∅, Sk+1 (P ) = Sk (P ),
else, for each truncation P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w) ∈ eT ¡T k (P )¢ ob-
tain µ
(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w)
F , which exists by Lemma 1.
Step 3: Define
T ∗
¡
T k (P )
¢
=



P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w) ∈ eT ¡T k (P )¢ |
Ch
µ
µ
(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w)
F (w) ∪ µ
(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)
F (w) , P (w)
¶
=
= µ
(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w)
F (w)



.
Order the set T ∗
¡
T k (P )
¢
in an arbitrary way and let ≺k+1 denote this ordering.
Step 4: Define
bT ¡T k (P )¢ =



P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w) ∈ T ∗
¡
T k (P )
¢ |
∀P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f 0,w0) ∈ T ∗
¡
T k (P )
¢
such that
P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w) ≺k+1 P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f 0,w0),
w0 ∈ µ(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w)F (f 0)



.
Set
T k+1 (P ) := bT ¡T k (P )¢ ,
Sk+1 (P ) := Sk (P )∪
½
µ
(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w)
F | P (fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)(f,w) ∈ T k+1 (P )
¾
,
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and
k := k + 1.
until T k (P ) is empty.
end.
Let K be the stage where the algorithm stops; i.e., TK (P ) = ∅. We can now
state our main result.
Theorem 1 Assume P is substitutable. Then SK (P ) = S (P ).
3.2 An Example
We illustrate how the algorithm works with the following example.
Example 2 Let F = {f1, f2, f3, f4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} be the two sets of
agents with the substitutable profile of preferences P , where
P (f1) = w1w2, w1w3, w2w4, w3w4, w1w4, w2w3, w1, w2, w3, w4
P (f2) = w1w2, w2w3, w1w4, w3w4, w1w3, w2w4, w1, w2, w3, w4
P (f3) = w3w4, w2w3, w1w4, w1w2, w2w4, w1w3, w1, w2, w3, w4
P (f4) = w3w4, w2w4, w1w3, w1w2, w2w3, w1w4, w1, w2, w3, w4
P (w1) = f3f4, f2f3, f2f4, f1f4, f1f3, f1f2, f1, f2, f3, f4
P (w2) = f3f4, f2f3, f1f4, f2f4, f1f3, f1f2, f1, f2, f3, f4
P (w3) = f1f2, f2f3, f1f3, f2f4, f1f4, f3f4, f1, f2, f3, f4
P (w4) = f1f2, f1f3, f1f4, f2f3, f2f4, f3f4, f1, f2, f3, f4.
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By the deferred-acceptance algorithm we obtain the two optimal stable matchings
µF =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w2 w1w2 w3w4 w3w4


µW =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2

 .
Set T 0 (P ) = P , S0 (P ) = {µF}, and k = 0.
Stage 1: The set eT (T 0 (P )) of Step 1 consists of the following truncations of P :
eT ¡T 0 (P )¢ = ©P (f1,w1), P (f1,w2), P (f2,w1), P (f2,w2), P (f3,w3), P (f3,w4), P (f4,w3), P (f4,w4)ª
where in all profiles firms and workers have the same preference as in P, except
P (f1,w1)(f1) = w2w4, w3w4, w2w3, w2, w3, w4
P (f1,w2)(f1) = w1w3, w3w4, w1w4, w1, w3, w4
P (f2,w1)(f2) = w2w3, w3w4, w2w4, w2, w3, w4
P (f2,w2)(f2) = w1w4, w3w4, w1w3, w1, w3, w4
P (f3,w3)(f3) = w1w4, w1w2, w2w4, w1, w2, w4
P (f3,w4)(f3) = w2w3, w1w2, w1w3, w1, w2, w3
P (f4,w3)(f4) = w2w4, w1w2, w1w4, w1, w2, w4
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P (f4,w4)(f4) = w1w3, w1w2, w2w3, w1, w2, w3.
In Step 2, and since the set eT (T 0 (P )) is non-empty, we obtain for each of its
truncations the corresponding firm-optimal stable matching
µ
(f1,w1)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w1w2 w3w4 w1w3


µ
(f1,w2)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w3 w1w2 w3w4 w2w4


µ
(f2,w1)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w2 w3w4 w3w4 w1w2


µ
(f2,w2)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w1w4 w2w3 w1w3


µ
(f3,w3)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w2w3 w1w4 w1w3


µ
(f3,w4)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w3 w1w4 w2w3 w2w4


µ
(f4,w3)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w1w4 w2w3 w1w2


µ
(f4,w4)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w1w2 w3w4 w1w3

 .
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Notice that µ(f1,w1)F = µ
(f4,w4)
F . In Step 3 we obtain the set T
∗ (T 0 (P )) =©
P (f1,w1), P (f4,w3), P (f4,w4)
ª
. For instance, the truncation P (f1,w2) does not belong
to this set because
Ch
³
µF (w2) ∪ µ
(f1,w2)
F (w2) , P (w2)
´
= Ch ({f1, f2} ∪ {f2, f4} , P (w2))
= Ch ({f1, f2, f4} , P (w2))
= {f1, f4}
6= {f2, f4}
= µ
(f1,w2)
F (w2),
but this is not a problem since µ(f1,w2)F is not stable because the pair (w2, f1)
blocks it. Considering the ordering P (f1,w1) ≺1 P (f4,w3) ≺1 P (f4,w4) we have
that bT (T 0 (P )) = ©P (f4,w4)ª since P (f1,w1) does not belong to it because w4 /∈
µ
(f1,w1)
F (f4) and P
(f1,w1) ≺1 P (f4,w4) and P (f4,w3) does not belong to it either be-
cause w4 /∈ µ(f4,w3)F (f4) and P (f4,w3) ≺1 P (f4,w4). Set T 1 (P ) =
©
P (f4,w4)
ª
and
S1(P ) = {µF , µ1} where µ1 = µ(f1,w1)F = µ(f4,w4)F . This finishes Stage 1.
Stage 2: In Step 1, we obtain for the truncation P (f4,w4) (the unique one be-
longing to the set T 1 (P )) the corresponding set of truncations using µ(f4,w4)F and
µW :
eT ¡T 1 (P )¢ =



P (f4,w4)(f1,w2), P (f4,w4)(f2,w1), P (f4,w4)(f2,w2),
P (f4,w4)(f3,w3), P (f4,w4)(f3,w4), P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)



.
Now, in Step 2 and since eT (T 1 (P )) 6= ∅, for each truncation in eT (T 1 (P )) we
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compute its corresponding firm—optimal stable matching
µ
(f4,w4)(f1,w2)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w1w2 w3w4 w1w2


µ
(f4,w4)(f2,w1)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w2 w3w4 w3w4 w1w2


µ
(f4,w4)(f2,w2)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w1w4 w2w3 w1w3


µ
(f4,w4)(f3,w3)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w2w3 w1w4 w1w3


µ
(f4,w4)(f3,w4)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w1w4 w2w3 w1w2


µ
(f4,w4)(f4,w3)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w1w4 w2w3 w1w2

 .
In Step 3 we obtain the set
T ∗
¡
T 1 (P )
¢
=
©
P (f4,w4)(f3,w4), P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)
ª
and consider the ordering P (f4,w4)(f3,w4) ≺2 P (f4,w4)(f4,w3). In Step 4 the set
bT (T 1 (P )) is the singleton set ©P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)ª since w3 /∈ µ(f4,w4)(f3,w4)F (f4). Set
T 2(P ) =
©
P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)
ª
and S2(P ) = {µF , µ1, µ2} where µ2 = µ(f4,w4)(f4,w3)F .
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Stage 3: In Step 1, we obtain for the truncation P (f4,w4)(f4,w3) its corresponding
truncations using µ(f4,w4)(f4,w3)F and µW :
eT ¡T 2 (P )¢ = ©P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f2,w1), P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3)ª .
Since it is non-empty we compute, in Step 2, the corresponding firm-optimal
stable matchings
µ
(f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f2,w1)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w2 w3w4 w3w4 w1w2


µ
(f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3)
F =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2

 .
In Step 3 we obtain the set
T ∗
¡
T 2 (P )
¢
=
©
P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3)
ª
.
Notice that P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f2,w1) does not belong to it because
Ch
³
µ
(f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f2,w1)
F (w1) ∪ µ
(f4,w4)(f4,w3)
F (w1) , P (w1)
´
= Ch({f1, f4} ∪ {f2, f4}, P (w1))
= {f2, f4}
6= {f1, f4}
= µ
(f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f2,w1)
F (w1).
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Since T ∗ (T 2 (P )) is a singleton set, we set T 3 (P ) = bT (T 2 (P )) = ©P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3)ª
and S3 (P ) = {µF , µ1, µ2, µW} because µ(f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3)F = µW .
Stage 4: Finally, the algorithm stops (that is, K = 4) because eT (T 3(P )) = ∅.
Therefore S(P ) = {µF , µ1, µ2, µW}, where
µF =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w2 w1w2 w3w4 w3w4


µ1 =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w1w2 w3w4 w1w3


µ2 =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w1w4 w2w3 w1w2


µW =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2

 .
3.3 Comments
Before moving to the next section to prove Theorem 1, a few comments about
the algorithm are in order.
First, for all truncations the worker-optimal stable matching coincides with
the worker-optimal stable matching of the original preference profile P ; that is,
µW = µ
(f11,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)
W for all P
(f11,wj1)...(fik ,wjk). To see this, consider the fol-
lowing modification of the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which workers make
oﬀers. At any step of the algorithm, and after firm f rejects the oﬀer of worker
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w, the preference of worker w is changed by declaring all sets of firms contain-
ing f as unacceptable. Now, the output of this modified algorithm is the same
matching µW and a new preference profile bP (which has the property that for
all w ∈ W , Ch(F, bP (w)) = µW (w)). Denote by bµW the output of the original
deferred-acceptance algorithm applied to the preference profile bP . Obviously,
µW = bµW (1)
and therefore,
µ
(f,w)
W = bµ(f,w)W (2)
for any (f,w)−truncation. Moreover,
bµ(f,w)W = bµW (3)
since w ∈ µF (f) \µW (f) implies that in both cases each worker w proposes
himself to the set µW (w), all oﬀers are accepted, and the algorithm terminates
just after step 1. Hence, by (1), (2), and (3),
µW = µ
(f,w)
W .
This fact is used in Step 1, and it guarantees that as the iteration process proceeds,
“the end point” stays the same and the iteration process will terminate once µW
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is reached.
Second, to make sure that the firm-optimal stable matching corresponding to
an (f, w)−truncation is indeed stable it is suﬃcient to check only that Property
4 of Remark 1 holds for worker w; that is, worker w would choose it if confronted
with the union of itself and the firm-optimal stable matching of the original
profile. This is what Step 3 does in each stage. In the light of Example 1 this is
surprising, although Lemma 2 in Section 4 states that this is the case. However,
the fact that a truncation only changes one firm’s preference guarantees that the
other properties of Remark 1 also hold.
Third, the algorithm would also work without Step 4. However, it helps very
much to speed up the algorithm (see Corollary 1 in Section 4) because, by adding
it, we avoid carrying to subsequent stages all truncations (and all others obtained
from them) whose corresponding firm-optimal stable matching will be identified
later on.
Fourth, the particular ordering on the set T ∗
¡
T k (P )
¢
is irrelevant but neces-
sary. Namely, it is necessary because we cannot ask for individual rationality of
each truncation against all other truncations. To see this consider in Stage 1 of
Example 2, the set T ∗ (T 0 (P )) =
©
P (f1,w1), P (f4,w3), P (f4,w4)
ª
. If we had defined
it without the restriction of the ordering, i.e.
bT⊀ ¡T 0 (P )¢ = nP (f,w) ∈ T ∗ ¡T 0 (P )¢ | ∀P (f 0,w0) ∈ T ∗ ¡T 0 (P )¢ , w0 ∈ µ(f,w)F (f 0)o
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this set would have been empty since P (f1,w1) /∈ bT⊀ (T 0 (P )) because w4 /∈
µ
(f1,w1)
F (f4), P
(f4,w3) /∈ bT⊀ (T 0 (P )) because w4 /∈ µ(f4,w3)F (f4), and (in contrast
with the correct definition of bT (T 0 (P ))) P (f4,w4) /∈ bT⊀ (T 0 (P )) because w1 /∈
µ
(f4,w4)
F (f1). Moreover, this ordering is irrelevant because the outcome of the
algorithm does not depend on the specific ordering on the set T ∗(T k(P )). For
instance, in Stage 1 of Example 2 we could have used (instead of ≺1) the or-
dering P (f4,w4) ≺10 P (f4,w3) ≺10 P (f1,w1) without altering the final outcome of the
algorithm.
Fifth, unfortunately we do not know how to use, in the design of the algorithm,
the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings. The problem is that, in
contrast with the marriage model, the lattice structure of the set of many-to-
many stable matchings identified by Blair (1988) is built upon a very complex
least upper bound. The proof of Theorem 4.11 in Blair (1988) shows that this
least upper bound has to be obtained as the limit of a sequence of matchings
constructed in a very indirect way.
Sixth, McVitie and Wilson’s (1971) algorithm computes the full set of one-
to-one stable matchings roughly as follows: (1) Compute µF by a version of the
deferred acceptance algorithm in which firms make oﬀers sequentially. (2) Break
the marriage of any matched pair (f, w) at µF forcing f to take a poorer worker
in his preference ordering along the new application of the deferred acceptance
algorithm (whose outcome is µ(f,w)F ). (3) Check the stability of µ
(f,w)
F by checking
that µ(f,w)F (w)P (w)µF (w). (4) Avoid multiple identifications of the same stable
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matching by restricting the pairs whose marriage is broken (according to point
(2) above); this restriction is based on the arbitrary order of firms used in the
sequential version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. In contrast, our extension
applied to the one-to-one matching model requires the following: (1) Compute
µW , as well as µF . (2) Break only the marriage of matched pairs (f, w) at µF such
that w ∈ µF (f) \µW (f). (3) To check the stability of µ(f,w)F it is not enough, in
our many-to-many setting, to check that µ(f,w)F (w)P (w)µF (w) holds; instead,
we have to insure that the stronger condition Ch
³
µ
(f,w)
F (w) ∪ µF (w) , P (w)
´
=
µ
(f,w)
F (w) is satisfied (observe that both conditions coincide in the one-to-one
case). (4) Avoid multiple identifications of the same stable matching (Step 4
of the algorithm) by using an arbitrary order on the set of profiles that have
successfully passed the choice property test (Step 3 of the algorithm). Finally,
in contrast to McVitie and Wilson’s (1971) algorithm, the one of Irving and
Leather (1986) does not obtain all stable matchings by successive application of
the deferred acceptance algorithm (to truncated preferences); instead, a stable
matching is obtained after breaking a marriage and satisfying a subset of identified
agents that form a cycle. The diﬃculty of extending their algorithm from the
one-to-one case to the many-to-many one is that there is no an unambiguous (and
useful) extension of the cycle generated by breaking a particular marriage.
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4 The Proof of the Theorem
Let P be a substitutable preference profile and let µF and µW be its corre-
sponding optimal stable matchings. Given an (f, w)−truncation of P where
w ∈ µF (f) \µW (f), denote by S(f,w) (P ) the set of stable matchings (with re-
spect to the truncated profile P (f,w)) that satisfy the Choice Property for w
relative to P ; namely,
S(f,w) (P ) =
©
µ ∈ S
¡
P (f,w)
¢ | Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ(w), P (w)) = µ(w)ª . (4)
Lemma 2 below says that S(f,w) (P ) is a subset of S (P ) . Hence, the Choice
Property for w relative to P is suﬃcient to guarantee stability of a matching
which is stable with respect to a truncation.
Lemma 2 For w ∈ µF (f) \µW (f), let µ be a matching such that µ ∈ S(f,w)(P ).
Then µ ∈ S(P ).
Proof. By µ ∈ S(f,w)(P ) we have w /∈ µ (f). Thus, µ is individually rational for
P . Suppose (ew, ef) blocks µ under P ; namely,
ef /∈ µ (ew) , (5)
ew ∈ Ch(µ( ef) ∪ {ew}, P ( ef)), and (6)
ef ∈ Ch(µ( ew) ∪ { ef}, P ( ew)). (7)
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If ef 6= f then the pair (ew, ef) also blocks µ under P (f,w), a contradiction. Thus,
ef = f. Then by conditions (6) and (7)
ew ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {ew}, P (f)) and (8)
f ∈ Ch(µ( ew) ∪ {f}, P ( ew)). (9)
Since µ ∈ S(f,w) (P ), then µ ∈ S
¡
P (f,w)
¢
; hence,
ew /∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {ew}, P (f,w)(f)), (10)
otherwise (ew, f) is a blocking pair for µ under P (f,w). The definition of P (f,w)(f)
and conditions (8) and (10) imply
w ∈ µ(f) ∪ {ew}.
But, by the definition of P (f,w)(f), w /∈ µ(f). Thus, ew = w. Now, we can rewrite
conditions (8) and (9) as
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) and
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ {f}, P (w)). (11)
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Since µ ∈ S(f,w) (P ), it follows by definition that
Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w)) = µ (w) . (12)
By condition (5), and the fact that ef = f and ew = w, f /∈ µ(w) which, together
with condition (11) and (12) imply that
Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f} , P (w))P (w)µ (w) = Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w)) . (13)
Therefore, since f ∈ µF (w), {f} ∪ µ (w) ⊆ µF (w) ∪ µ (w) . Hence,
Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w))R (w)Ch (µ (w) ∪ {f} , P (w)) .
But this contradicts condition (13).
The next Lemma establishes two useful properties of the choice set.
Lemma 3 For all subsets of partners A,B, and C of agent a ∈ F ∪W :
(a) Ch (A ∪B,P (a)) = Ch (Ch (A,P (a)) ∪B,P (a)).
(b) Ch (A ∪B,P (a)) = A and Ch (B ∪ C,P (a)) = B imply Ch (A ∪ C,P (a)) =
A.
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Proof. Property (a) follows from Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988). To prove (b),
consider the following equalities:
Ch (A ∪ C,P (a)) = Ch (Ch (A ∪B,P (a)) ∪ C,P (a)) by hypothesis
= Ch (A ∪B ∪ C,P (a)) by (a)
= Ch (A ∪ Ch (B ∪ C,P (a)) , P (a)) by (a)
= Ch (A ∪B,P (a)) by hypothesis
= A by hypothesis.
Lemma 4 below can be understood as a strengthening of Lemma 2. It says
that checking the Choice Property (for w relative to P ) for only the firm-optimal
stable matching is suﬃcient to guarantee that all stable matchings relative to the
truncated profile are indeed stable for the original profile.
Lemma 4 Let P (f,w) be a truncation such that
Ch
³
µF (w) ∪ µ
(f,w)
F (w), P (w)
´
= µ
(f,w)
F (w)
holds. Then, µ ∈ S(P (f,w)) implies µ ∈ S(P ).
31
Proof. Let µ be a matching such that µ ∈ S(P (f,w)). By Lemma 1 and the
Choice Property for w relative to P (f,w),
Ch
³
µ(w) ∪ µ(f,w)F (w), P (f,w) (w)
´
= µ(w).
However, preferences P (f,w) (w) and P (w) coincide. Therefore,
Ch
³
µ(w) ∪ µ(f,w)F (w), P (w)
´
= µ(w) (14)
also holds. By hypothesis,
Ch
³
µF (w) ∪ µ
(f,w)
F (w), P (w)
´
= µ
(f,w)
F (w). (15)
By Lemma 3 we have that conditions (14) and (15) imply
Ch (µF (w) ∪ µ(w), P (w)) = µ(w).
Hence, by definition, µ ∈ S(f,w) (P ), and by Lemma 2, µ ∈ S(P ).
Lemma 5 says that, for a given stable matching, adding the individual ra-
tionality condition relative to a truncation ensures that the matching is stable
relative to the truncated profile. This will immediately imply Corollary 1 which
will be crucial to the justification of Step 4 in the algorithm.
Lemma 5 Let µ be a matching such that µ ∈ S(P ) ∩ IR
¡
P (f,w)
¢
. Then µ ∈
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S(P (f,w)).
Proof. Assume µ /∈ S(P (f,w)). Since µ ∈ IR
¡
P (f,w)
¢
, there must exist a blocking
pair (ew, ef) of µ; namely, ew /∈ µ³ ef´,
ew ∈ Ch(µ( ef) ∪ {ew}, P (f,w)( ef)), and (16)
ef ∈ Ch(µ(ew) ∪ { ef}, P (f,w)(ew)). (17)
Consider the following two cases:
1. ef 6= f. Since P (f,w)(ew) = P (ew) and P (f,w) ³ ef´ = P ³ ef´ the pair (ew, ef) also
blocks the matching µ in the preference profile P . Hence, µ /∈ S (P ).
2. ef = f. Then by conditions (16) and (17)
ew ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {ew}, P (f,w)(f)), (18)
and hence ew 6= w, and
f ∈ Ch(µ( ew) ∪ {f}, P (ew)).
The hypothesis that µ ∈ IR
¡
P (f,w)
¢
implies that µ (f) = Ch
¡
µ (f) , P (f,w) (f)
¢
.
Thus, w /∈ µ (f). Consequently, condition (18) can be rewritten as ew ∈
Ch(µ(f) ∪ {ew}, P (f)), implying that the pair (ew, f) blocks µ in the pref-
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erence profile P . Hence µ /∈ S (P ).
As we have just said, Corollary 1 below justifies the insertion of Step 4 at each
stage of the algorithm. If we have two truncations P (f,w) and P (f
0,w0) with the
properties that (1) their corresponding firm-optimal stable matchings µ(f,w)F and
µ
(f 0,w0)
F satisfy the Choice Property for w and w
0, respectively (that is, they are
stable relative to the original profile) and (2) the matching µ(f
0,w0)
F is individually
rational relative to P (f,w) (that is, w /∈ µ(f
0,w0)
F (f)), then we need not add µ
(f 0,w0)
F
at this stage (with the subsequent computational savings) because we will find it
later on (and add it to the provisional set of stable matchings) as a firm-optimal
stable matching of a subsequent truncation of P (f,w).
Corollary 1 Let P (f,w), P (f 0,w0) be two truncations such that µ(f
0,w0)
F ∈ S (P ). If
w /∈ µ(f
0,w0)
F (f), then µ
(f 0,w0)
F ∈ S
¡
P (f,w)
¢
.
Proof. The hypothesis µ(f
0,w0)
F ∈ S (P ) implies that µ
(f 0,w0)
F ∈ IR (P ). Since w /∈
µ
(f 0,w0)
F (f), it follows that µ
(f 0,w0)
F ∈ IR
¡
P (f,w)
¢
. Hence, by Lemma 5, µ(f
0,w0)
F ∈
S(P (f,w)).
The next lemma establishes a useful fact about the set of stable matchings:
a worker who is matched to the same firm in the two optimal stable matchings
has also to be matched to the same firm in all stable matchings.
Lemma 6 Assume w ∈ µF (f) ∩ µW (f). Then, w ∈ µ (f) for all µ ∈ S (P ) .
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Proof. Suppose there exist w, f , and µ ∈ S (P ) such that w ∈ µF (f)∩ µW (f)
and w /∈ µ (f). By Remark 1,
Ch (µF (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) = µF (f)
and
Ch (µW (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w)) = µW (w) .
Since w ∈ µF (f), this implies w ∈ Ch (µF (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)); hence, w ∈
Ch ({w} ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) since P is a substitutable preference profile.
Now, w ∈ µW (f) implies f ∈ µW (w). It follows that f ∈ Ch (µW (w) ∪ µ (w) , P (w))
which means that f ∈ Ch ({f} ∪ µ (w) , P (w)). Since w /∈ µ (f), this implies that
(w, f) is a blocking pair for µ which contradicts µ ∈ S (P ). Thus, w ∈ µ (f) .
Lemma 7 and its Corollary 2 guarantee that any non-optimal stable matching
µ will eventually be identified and selected as the firm-optimal stable matching
corresponding to a preference profile which will be obtained after truncating the
preferences of a sequence of firms.
Lemma 7 Let µ ∈ S(P ) be such that µF 6= µ. Then there exists P (f,w) with
w ∈ µF (f)\µW (f) and w /∈ µ (f) such that µ ∈ S(P (f,w)).
Proof. Since µF 6= µ, there exist w and f such that w ∈ µF (f)\µ(f). If this
were not so, then µF (f) ⊆ µ (f) for all f . By Property 1 of Remark 1, and since
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µ ∈ IR (P ), then
µF (f) = Ch (µF (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) = µ (f) for all f .
Thus, µF = µ which is a contradiction. Since w /∈ µ (f), it follows from Lemma
6 that w /∈ µW (f). Consider the preference profile P (f,w). Because w /∈ µ (f), we
have that µ ∈ IR
¡
P (f,w)
¢
, since µ ∈ S (P ) and P (f,w) (a) = P (a) for all a 6= f .
By Lemma 5, µ ∈ S
¡
P (f,w)
¢
.
Remark 2 Let P (f,w) be a preference profile such that its corresponding µ(f,w)F
satisfies the Choice Property for w relative to P . By Lemma 4, |S(P )| ≥¯¯
S(P (f,w))
¯¯
.11 Then w ∈ µF (f)\µW (f) implies µF /∈ S(P (f,w)), and |S(P )| >¯¯
S(P (f,w))
¯¯
.
Corollary 2 Let µ ∈ S(P ) be such that µF 6= µ. Then there exists a sequence of
pairs (fi1, wj1) ... (fik , wjk) such that µ = µ
(fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)
F ∈ S(P (
fi1 ,wj1)...(fik ,wjk)).
Proof. Let µ ∈ S(P ) be such that µF 6= µ. By Lemma 7 there exists P (f,w)
such that µ ∈ S(P (f,w)). If µ = µ(f,w)F , the statement follows. Otherwise (in
which case, by Remark 2 we have that |S(P )| > ¯¯S(P (f,w))¯¯), we apply again
Lemma 7 replacing the roles of P and µF by P
(f,w)and µ(f,w)F , respectively. Since
|S(P )| <∞, the statement of Corollary 2 follows.
11The notation |S(P )| means the number of stable matchings under preference profile P .
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Now, we are ready to show that the outcome of the algorithm is the set of
stable matchings.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, from Lemma 4, we have S1 (P ) ⊆ S (P ) . Applying
iteratively Lemma 4 to successive stages we obtain
SK (P ) ⊆ S (P ) .
Second, assume that µ ∈ S (P ) . By Corollary 2, there exists k ≤ K such that
µ ∈ Sk (P ). Therefore,
S (P ) ⊆ SK (P ) .
5 Concluding Remark
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we come to understand that the firm-
optimal stable matching of truncated preference profiles might be stable in the
original profile. Second, we discover that the Choice Property for w relative to
P is the only thing that has to be checked to guarantee the stability of this
matching (Lemmas 2, 3, and 4). Third, and more importantly, we show that all
stable matchings are identified in this way (Lemmas 5, 6, and 7).
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6 Appendix
To illustrate the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which firms make oﬀers we use
the preference profile P (f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3) of Example 2 to compute µ(f4,w4)(f4,w3)(f3,w3)F ;
that is, F = {f1, f2, f3, f4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} are the two sets of agents
with the following substitutable profile of preferences
P (f1) = w1w2, w1w3, w2w4, w3w4, w1w4, w2w3, w1, w2, w3, w4
P (f2) = w1w2, w2w3, w1w4, w3w4, w1w3, w2w4, w1, w2, w3, w4
P (f3) = w1w4, w1w2, w2w4, w1, w2, w4
P (f4) = w1w2, w1, w2
P (w1) = f3f4, f2f3, f2f4, f1f4, f1f3, f1f2, f1, f2, f3, f4
P (w2) = f3f4, f2f3, f1f4, f2f4, f1f3, f1f2, f1, f2, f3, f4
P (w3) = f1f2, f2f3, f1f3, f2f4, f1f4, f3f4, f1, f2, f3, f4
P (w4) = f1f2, f1f3, f1f4, f2f3, f2f4, f3f4, f1, f2, f3, f4.
The oﬀers made by firms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step 1
are:
f1 f2 f3 f4
w1w2 w1w2 w1w4 w1w2
w1 w2 w3 w4
f1f2f3f4 f1f2f4 ∅ f3
f3f4 f1f4 ∅ f3.
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The provisional matching µ1 after Step 1 is:
µ1 =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2 ∅ w1w4 w1w2

 .
The oﬀers made by firms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step 2
are:
f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w3w4 w1w4 w1w2
w1 w2 w3 w4
f3f4 f1f4 f2 f1f2f3
f3f4 f1f4 f2 f1f2.
The provisional matching µ2 after Step 2 is:
µ2 =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w3w4 w1 w1w2

 .
The oﬀers made by firms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step 3
are:
f1 f2 f3 f4
w2w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2
w1 w2 w3 w4
f3f4 f1f3f4 f2 f1f2
f3f4 f3f4 f2 f1f2.
39
The provisional matching µ3 after Step 3 is:
µ3 =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2

 .
The oﬀers made by firms, and received and accepted by workers, in Step 4
are:
f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2
w1 w2 w3 w4
f3f4 f3f4 f1f2 f1f2
f3f4 f3f4 f1f2 f1f2.
the provisional matching µ4 after Step 4 is:
µ4 =


f1 f2 f3 f4
w3w4 w3w4 w1w2 w1w2

 .
The algorithm stops after Step 4 because all oﬀers have been accepted. The provi-
sional matching µ4, becomes definite, and it is the firm-optimal stable matching.
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